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Abstract 
With constantly increasing risks of product piracy the cost-efficiency question of protection mechanisms has to be addressed in order to 
promote investment into anti-counterfeiting. Current research allows for the determination of a company’s specific risk situation. The 
evaluation of strategic alternatives, however, still needs to be examined further in order to allow well-founded anti-counterfeiting decision 
making. Exploring one possible approach this paper, therefore, investigates the use of attack and defense tree methods, as known from IT-
security research, and shows their applicability within anti-counterfeiting analysis. The method introduced extends existing cost-benefit 
analyses and focuses on the effectivity evaluation of technical countermeasures exemplarily.   
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1. Introduction 
Throughout history innovations are a powerful force for 
transformation and are named as one of the main constituents 
for continuous economic growth [54]. However, innovations 
are nowadays imitated at an increasing rate and speed, 
reducing the profitability of research and development 
projects. The risk of being imitated, and thus not being able to 
exploit the full return on innovation, is currently as high as 
never before and cannot be ignored by the original producers 
any longer [51]. Simply reducing the length of innovation 
cycles is not enough [34]. Instead, companies have to actively 
invest into anti-counterfeiting measures in order to secure 
their local and global competitive advantage [14, 21].  
When first addressing counterfeiting, companies need to 
assess their counterfeiting risk and examine the possible anti-
counterfeiting strategy alternatives [1, 25]. Current research 
allows for a first prioritization of fields of action [14, 25], 
however, a clear guideline and cost-efficiency analysis is yet 
to be devised. Generally, it is advised to combat the rising 
threat of product piracy through a mixture of protection 
mechanisms, whilst only relying on one type is seen as 
insufficient [1, 21, 28]. Still, looking at the vast range of 
possible countermeasures most decision makers doubt their 
potential and fear the necessary investment.  
Within IT-security research so-called attack and defense 
trees, methodically constructed tree structures, are used in 
order to depict and analyze specific risk situations [25]. 
Similarly, these are also employed within political protection 
mechanism analysis [30]. These trees allow for the deduction 
of specific scenario models and yield the possibility to 
determine the effectivity variable within the cost-effectiveness 
analysis [22]. An examination in the field of anti-
counterfeiting has not been conducted so far. However, it is 
expected that attack and defense tree models offer the 
potential to enable company representatives to choose and 
justify protection mechanisms more appropriately when 
applied in anti-counterfeiting decision making. 
This paper, therefore, aims to describe counterfeiting risk 
situations using available and adapted attack and defense tree 
approaches and to determine the effectivity of technical 
protection mechanisms using these methods. 
In doing so the following two steps are focused: 
1. Deduction and modelling of counterfeiting protection 
scenarios  
 2015 The uthors. Published by Elsevier . . This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Peer-review under responsibility of the organizing committee of CIRPe 2015 - Understanding the life cycle implications of manufacturing
13 E. Gossen et al. /  Procedia CIRP  37 ( 2015 )  12 – 17 
 
2. Effectivity evaluation of technical countermeasures 
This approach extends and completes the iterative cycle of 
process protection by including a first effectivity analysis and 
thus allowing for a well-founded selection of protection 
mechanisms as shown in Fig.1.  
 
Fig.1:  Iterative cycle of process protection (extending [14, 43]); red: 
focus of the presented research 
Within industrial application a handbook and software support 
based on the herein described method is currently in 
development in order to reduce the complexity and enable a 
quicker evaluation and choice of countermeasures. Even 
though expert evaluation is necessary for the final models, 
assistance for simplified application is expected to yield a 
higher rate of utilisation, leading to a more thought through 
anti-counterfeiting strategy.   
Furthermore, it is clear that the presented method needs to be 
applied after the company has evaluated its anti-counterfeiting 
risks (e.g. using the method presented in [14, 25]) and cannot 
be a standalone solution. 
2. Fundamentals 
With counterfeiting not being consistently defined in 
literature, a multitude of different forms are described. 
Plagiarism, copy, (slavish) imitation and counterfeit are some 
of the terminology employed. For this paper the current 
definition by the German manufacturing association (VDMA) 
[51] is adapted and counterfeiting is defined as an unpermitted 
reproduction violating property rights or acting in an 
anticompetitive manner (i.e. dishonest act or purposeful 
deception of the customer). To classify forms of 
counterfeiting, these are judged according to their quality and 
degree of deception. 
2.1. Counterfeiting risks and countermeasures  
Counterfeiting risks are generally seen to arise due to 
human, process or system failure, or because of external 
events. They can lead to a loss of competitive advantage due 
to knowledge leak, reputational loss, decline in sales, loss of 
market share or unjustified recourse claims [53]. Aiming to 
minimize losses original producers can choose from a variety 
of countermeasures. These are subdivided in varying 
categories, but generally into legal, technical and 
organizational countermeasures [1]. Some authors further 
include political measures [17, 47]. Technical counter-
measures themselves are further subdivided into design 
measures and the integration of security systems, such as 
track-&-trace technologies [1, 3, 34]. Within the latter group 
the RFID (radio frequency identification) technology is 
promoted most (see e.g. [27]).  
Generally, when looking at possible anti-counterfeiting 
options companies face the optimization problem: Both, the 
risk reduction achieved and the customer acceptance need to 
be maximized, whilst costs need to be minimized at the same 
time. Whereas the costs can be determined rather easily and 
the customer acceptance can be approximated using surveys, 
the risk reduction of anti-counterfeiting measures is so far not 
determined in research.  
2.2. IT-Security models 
Due to the increasing degree of integration and complexity 
of individual companies, both vulnerabilities and potential 
target points multiply within IT-systems [53]. With their 
congruent knowledge computer systems linked with the 
internet are a potential target from almost any place of the 
globe [33]. In order to create a specific standard within the 
implementation and generation of IT-security, and thus for a 
basic protection of enterprises, norms and recognized security 
standards act as guidelines [20]. The protection objectives 
within these standards are authenticity, integrity, 
confidentiality, availability, reliability and data security [9]. 
Generally, an attack on an IT-system occurs exploiting an 
existing weakness and is of human origin. Furthermore, the 
attacks are divided into three main groups: attacks exploiting 
network weaknesses, social engineering attacks and bypasses 
of physical security measures [49]. 
Already existing and still to be implemented protection 
mechanisms can be judged using developed IT-security 
assessments. During this evaluation two basic criteria are 
important: the economic feasibility and the effectivity. Both 
criteria are assessed qualitatively, quantitatively, or ideally 
both. However, due to the highly dynamic and ephemeral 
nature of the state of art, the crucial quantitative description 
often remains incomplete. Instead, risk analysis of the 
individual security system support or substitute the cost-
effectiveness evaluation.  
Existing relevant cost-effectiveness models known from IT 
research are: 
x the IT-security-cost-function by Olovsson [36],  
x the Return on Security Investment (ROSI) [45],  
x the Gordon & Loeb model [15].  
As further, more general models the following are named: 
x the Net Present Value [7],  
x the Monte-Carlo analysis [37] and 
x the Markowitz's portfolio selection theory [29].  
These, however, are not equally promising and therefore not 
detailed further.  
  
One key element of Olovsson’s IT-security cost-function is 
it showing the security level achieved not being a linear 
function of the amount of capital invested (see Fig.2). For low 
original IT-security levels a small investment increases the 
protection level significantly. Instead, a high protection level 




































































Fig.2: IT-security-cost-function by Olovsson [36] 
The ROSI model, being the most familiar concept, fixed 
the maximum achievable effectivity of a countermeasure at 
85% [45]. With difficulties concerning the quantitative 
determination of individual variables remaining, it is a good 
first approximation model yielding a guiding value for 
decision makers. Gordon & Loeb on the other hand use their 
model to determine an upper cost-effective investment limit. 
They show it to be uneconomical to invest more than 37% of 
the expected damage into IT security. In addition, their model 
demonstrates that the investment’s effects depend on the 
vulnerability of the subsystem and thus even a high 
investment can result in a security level reduction [16]. 
Generally, looking at all models and methods, the 
effectivity assessment is primarily carried out on the basis of 
soft and qualitative tools, such as audits and support-tools. 
Amongst support-tools vulnerability and penetration tests are 
widely applied, using prioritization and graph-theoretical 
methods [4]. 
2.3. Attack  and Defense Trees within IT-Security research 
Attack and defense trees, as well as their combinations and 
modifications, are graph-theoretical models applied within the 
scope of decision support [22]. Using graph-theoretical 
models, systems under attack can be analyzed and modified. 
The analysis enables the identification of specific attack 
behavior and strategies and the prediction of possible future 
attacks. The aim of such approaches is to use topological tree 
structures to quantitatively and qualitatively evaluate security 
investments and remaining risks. There are already examples 
within IT-security research to use them efficiently and in a 
cost-effective manner [4, 5]. 
The directed graph scenarios are modelled using predefined 
standardized symbols (see Fig.3). A graph consists of nodes, 
edges for connection, attributes for description and the 
connectors mapping the set operations. For the analysis of 
security systems the static models stand out [22]. The most 
prominent representatives of this group are the attack, defense 
and attack-defense trees. The attack tree represents an attack 
at different levels and can be described qualitatively and 
quantitatively. The defense tree is an attack tree expanded by 
countermeasures at the lowest nodes. One disadvantage of this 
tree is its quantitative description being defined only on the 
basis of the return on investment (ROI) [5]. The attack-
defense tree is a combination of the two tree structures 
mentioned before. It is an attack tree expanded by 
countermeasures to the attacks on all levels. The description 
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Fig.3:    Overview of different graph scenario models and predefined graph 
symbols (adapted from [10]) 
2.4. Uncertainty modelling  
A model displays an abstraction of a natural system. 
Aligning a theoretical model with the uncertainties of natural 
systems is done through a careful consideration of the range 
of possible input values and their probabilities. Uncertainty 
modelling is, therefore, used by decision makers in order to be 
able to judge the consequences of the chosen parameters [6, 
11]. Depending on the specific case a modelling approach 
from the following most widespread methods is chosen: 
expert assessment [24], sensitivity analysis [40], emulation 
[35] or data-based approaches [50]. 
The sensitivity analysis is an examination of how the output 
value changes under variation of the input values.  Thereby it 
is crucial to note that the method focuses on the uncertainty of 
input variables and not on structural uncertainties of the 
model [40]. This can be done by more complex Monte-Carlo 
methods or using the one-factor-at-a-time-method [8]. 
3. Modelling of counterfeiting protection scenarios 
A scenario is defined as a coherent and consistent structure 
of potential perspectives of the future [32]. The scenario 
development is typically based on the so-called scenario 
technique [44]. Within the presented work this technique is 
used to complement graph-theoretical models. The objective 
is to describe the matter under consideration in a systematic 
and structured way. Additionally, the overall complexity is to 
be detected and illustrated. Creating a scenario consists of 
three phases: the analysis phase, the projection phase and the 
synthesis phase [44].  
In the analysis phase the problem statement and the 
objectives are defined. Further, the object of study or the 
study area, as well as the influencing factors, are determined. 
In the projection phase the scenario is developed analytically 
or intuitively. The aim of such a systematic approach is to 
capture the effect of the influencing factors and possible 
interactions on the one hand, but also to bundle scenarios on 
the other hand. The factors are then divided into passive and 
active factors in order to identify their controllability. Finally, 
keeping consistency in mind, images of the future are 
formulated and detailed, resulting in the definition of best-, 
worst- and trend-scenario [13]. The final synthesis phase is 
usually used for the analysis of consequences and 
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perturbations, as well as the processing of findings. In the 
here presented research, this phase is replaced through static 
directed graphs yielding the benefits of a quantitative analysis.  
Based on the scenario technique and the directed graphs, 
the following procedure is chosen: 
1. First the topic scope, e.g. a product or a location is 
defined, setting the requirement framework. Hereby it is 
crucial that the matter under consideration is formulated 
mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive [39]. For 
the selection of risk scenarios for the moment the works 
by Kuske [25] and Kleine [21] are referred to. 
2. After defining the scope, following the procedure by 
Schaffert [42] for the analysis and projection phase, 
scenarios are deduced. The result is a number of possible 
scenarios how the system, the topic in scope, could be 
attacked. 
3. Once scenarios are set up, the appropriate graph-
theoretical approach is chosen. Essential aspects under 
consideration for the decision are the evaluation options 
and the desire to display attack and defense aspects or 
only attacks. In order to assist the graphical modeling 
phase tools, such as the ADTool [2] or SeaMonster [31], 
are used for visual figures. Such tools allow the 
illustration of the object of observation in a qualitative or 
quantitative manner as attack and defense trees. 
The aim of the final step is the interpretation of the scenario 
and the identification of the best-, worst and trend-scenario. 
Using this knowledge future action alternatives can be 
deduced, whose effectivity is then to be evaluated.  
4. Effectivity evaluation 
Judging security applications one looks at two key 
measures: Cost effectiveness and the therein crucial 
effectivity variable. The ideal goal is to maximize both. 
Adapting the IT-security approach for anti-counterfeiting, the 
evaluation of graphical tree structure scenarios is presented. 
Using the general framework as a starting point, specific 
attributes and the return on investment for a specific 
countermeasure are deduced.  
4.1. Parameters 
For the effectivity evaluation the following pre-conditions 
are defined (extending [25]):  
1. The pirate acts on the principle of profit maximization. 
2. Interactions between the individual protection 
mechanisms are not considered for the moment. 
3. The effectiveness of a countermeasure is assumed to 
be constant in time for a limited forecast period. 
4.2. Definition and analysis of attributes 
A directed tree formulated according to graph-theoretical 
principles is described quantitatively using attributes. Such 
attributes can be the probability of success, the cost of an 
attack or the amount of damage experienced. For the 
presented work the attributes ‘probability of a successful 
attack’ and ‘minimum cost for the attacker’ are employed, 
being comprehensively formulated and allowing for complete 
modelling and within attack trees. In order to describe the 
attributes the weighted rating approach is applied, which 
means that sub-attacks are first evaluated in terms of the 
attributes and then prioritized. The return on investment is 
then finally determined as a third attribute using the defense 
tree extension.  
Looking at the calculation of the probability of a successful 
attack, probabilities must be assigned to every sub-attack 
following an expert prioritization using established criteria. 
Thereby the probability of all attacks summed equals 100%, 
expecting that one attack will occur [41]. The individual 
attack probabilities are not linearly distributed according to 
the prioritization. Instead, it is postulated for this work that 
complex attacks occur less frequently, most likely one attack 
being twice as probable as the second. This is included in the 
following regressive approach: 
σ ܿ௠ כ ݇௜ ൌ ͳ௡௜ୀଵ ʹ כ ݇௜ ൌ ݇௜ାଵ         (1) 
 
In order to increasing certainty, uncertainty models and the 
assessment of customer behaviour are commonly used [26, 
48]. However, these increase the complexity, cost and time of 
application, so that no acceptance for the method 
implementation is expected in practice. As a compromise a 
sensitivity analysis based on one-factor-at-a-time-method is 
chosen [8]. 
The allocation of the minimum cost for the attacker is 
simply based on a linear relationship between the weighted 
criteria using expert knowledge and research [19]. The real 
cost of a countermeasure is thereby presupposed. Having 
defined the sub-attacks, both attributes are finally calculated 
using the existent tool.  
The calculation of the return on investment (ROI) is based 
on known applications in defense tree research [5]. It is 
performed as following: 
ܴܱܫ ൌ  ሺ஺௅ாכோெሻି஼ௌூ஼ௌூ     (2) 
 
ܿ௠ Number of m-prioritization 
  
݇௜ ݅-th attack 
n no. of countermeasures examined 
m no. of countermeasures chosen  
RM Risk mitigated by countermeasure 
ܴܱܫ Return on investment 
First, the ALE is calculated using the method described by 
Kuske [25]. Then, for each countermeasure the CSI is defined 
by the actual investment needed to realize the specific 
countermeasure. Finally, the RM is determined as a result of 
the examined single countermeasure effecting the attack-
defense tree in the given thread situation. 
5. Exemplary method implementation 
By using the decision model of Kuske [25] the overall 
counterfeiting risk for an example company is quantified and 
the potential strategy alternatives are determined, however not 
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evaluated concerning effectivity. Exemplarily, the product 
with a high profit share and sales volume (thus high risk) of 
this examined company was now chosen as the object for 
detailed observation. The respective threat situation for the 
analysis phase is defined by the specific process and product 
environment, similar to the risk environment of IT-Systems 
described before. It is described by company experts going 
through a predefined threat catalogue and extending this 
through internal knowledge. The completeness of all threats is 
aimed at, relying on company experts on the one hand, and 
being assisted through product and process key risk indicators 
defined extending existing work (e.g. [1,12,25,27,28]) on the 
other hand. Consequently, one potential (technical) 
countermeasure to be assessed is identified for each treat. One 
example for a chosen technical countermeasure, combating 
both product and process risks, is marking for traceability and 
thus identification through for example barcodes or RFID. 
Overall, the complete threat situation is finally specified by n-
countermeasures for n-threats. 
Following this analysis phase, the prepared threat situation 
was evaluated using the developed attack-defense-tree 
approach. The aim was a quantitative statement on the 
probabilities of a successful attack and conversely the 
effectivity of the respective countermeasures. 
Following the procedure described in part 4, the 
complexity of the task, i.e. the knowledge needed for an 
attack and the risk faced by a potential attacker are rated 
based on a semi-quantitative approach [38]. In the first 
evaluation a scale from one (low) to three (high) is chosen. 
Subsequently, the sub-attacks are prioritized and probabilities 
allocated regressively (see (1)). Transferring these 
probabilities to the tree structure, a chosen countermeasure is 
tested on the respective tree-node. Using weighted 
effectivities the analysis is extended further [19,26]. For this 
the effectivity is yet again denoted in three levels: 1st level 
‘ideal’= 1,00; 2nd level ‘conservative’= 0,85; 3rd level ‘human 
error possible’= 0,50 (based on the models described in part 
2). Processing the accumulated data the effect of each single 
example countermeasure is analyzed and possible best-and 
worst-case scenario shifts are observed. In order to include 
uncertainty evaluation into the semi-quantitative approach a 
sensitivity analysis is performed. For all examined 
countermeasures the effectivities on the threat situation are 
recorded and the ROI is calculated using case values obtained 
from the quantitative tree model.  
Analyzing the ROI calculated for examined threat 
situations a correlation with the Gordon & Loeb factor 
(denoting a maximum of 37% of the expected damage to be 
invested into countermeasures) was observed. This is done by 
comparing the calculated ROI with the percentage of expected 
damage invested. A correlation of results is achieved when for 
all negative ROIs an investment greater than 37% of the 
expected damage is anticipated. The results of the first 
simplified method implementation for a range of chosen 
technical countermeasure for the product under examination 
showed the ROI to be consistent with the threshold identified 
by Gordon & Loeb in the majority of cases.  
Looking at the list of available and predetermined 
countermeasures, not only the amount to be invested, but also 
the effectivity of the countermeasure and the ROI were 
estimated. Choosing the set of ‘effective’ countermeasures is, 
therefore, now assisted by first checking the single effectivity, 
followed by the ROI. The number of used countermeasures is 
finally limited by:  
ͲǤ͵͹ כ ܦܽ݉ܽ݃݁ ൌ σ ܫ݊ݒ݁ݏݐ݉݁݊ݐ௠ି௖௢௨௡௧௘௥௠௘௔௦௨௥௘௠௜ୀଵ (3) 
Overall, the method assists the choice of m-countermeasures 
individually characterized by the named attributes and the 
individual as well as total effectivity of the countermeasure 
set respective of the needed total investment. As always final 
expert cross-check proved helpful at this stage, too. 
6. Conclusion 
6.1. Summary 
The adaptation of graphical attack- and defense tree 
methods, as known from IT-security research, for anti-
counterfeiting effectivity analysis shows great potential in two 
aspects as outlined in this paper. On the one hand, extreme 
scenario options for countermeasure choice can be deduced, 
whilst on the other hand the impact of countermeasure 
application can be quantified. Thereby, currently existing 
models are considerably improved allowing for the 
identification of worst- and best-case-scenarios using 
quantitative attack trees. Applying this knowledge possible 
counterfeiter approaches can be depicted, giving companies a 
warning and more definitive hint for countermeasure choice. 
Remaining uncertainties need to be kept in consideration; it is, 
however, to be assumed that countermeasures will be applied 
at those points where most damage is expected. This point 
would then be represented by the worst-case and trend-
scenario.  
Using the graphical model of a tree structure the impact 
point of countermeasures is thus illustrated and their 
consequences become visible and traceable along all 
individual nodes.  
6.2. Limitations of the methodology 
The defined pre-conditions represent the boundaries of the 
depicted efficiency analysis. The analysis of the impact of an 
individual countermeasure is limited since the impact of a 
countermeasure is focused on a single tree node. This means 
that reciprocities of one countermeasure on multiple sub-
attacks cannot be fully quantified and the effective range is so 
far determined only theoretically. Furthermore, with the 
applied tree structures being static models, the time factor is 
not included in the examination. 
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